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Abstract
This paper investigates the eect of inequality on economic growth in nondemocratic
regimes. We provide a model where a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that
constrains the policy choice of the ruler. The ruler must care about the support share
of citizens to keep power. Under an extractive institution, the ruler can extract a
large share of citizens' wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power due to low
public support. We show that inequality aects the ruler's trade-o between his or her
expropriation of citizens' wealth and hold on power. Larger inequality among citizens
makes the support share for the ruler less responsive to the choice of the institution by
the ruler. This situation allows the ruler to choose an extractive institution without a
signicant increase in the risk of losing power. Hence, large inequality leads to extractive
institutions and impedes investment and growth. These results provide an explanation
for the negative relationship between inequality and growth observed in nondemocratic
countries and the negative relationship between inequality and quality of institutions.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between inequality and economic growth has attracted the interest of many
economists; it has been investigated both empirically and theoretically. The seminal work
of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Perotti (1996) show using
cross-country regression analysis that inequality is negatively related with the subsequent
growth.1 A number of studies explore the channel through which inequality aects economic
growth, and the prevailing explanation in the literature is that credit market imperfections
or redistributional policies (as a result of majority voting) link inequality with economic
growth.2
However, more recent empirical studies that deal with econometric problems such as
measurement error and omitted variable bias indicate the need for a dierent explanation
on how inequality is related to the subsequent growth. Using a data set that improves
the measure of inequality, Deininger and Squire (1998) reveal that inequality in assets has
a negative impact on economic growth only in nondemocratic countries.3 Moreover, Barro
(2000) uses the panel data method and nds that the eect of inequality on growth is negative
in poor countries but positive in rich ones.4 Since poor countries are often less democratic
than rich ones, this evidence suggests that the relationship between inequality and growth
could depend on political regimes.
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically consider the relationship between inequality
and growth in a nondemocracy in order to explain these empirical ndings. As many empir-
ical studies show a signicant impact of institutions on growth,5 the lack of institutions to
constrain expropriation by the government, such as a checks and balances system, hinders
steady economic growth. We consider how the quality of institutions (the level of property
rights protection) is endogenously determined in an undemocratic political process and argue
that inequality hinders economic growth since it creates bad institutions.
We provide a model where a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that constrains
the policy choice of the ruler. The institution aects not only the leeway for the ruler to
expropriate citizens' wealth but also the ruler's political survival, which depends on the
share of citizens who support the ruler. The ruler who chooses an extractive institution can
expropriate a large share of citizens' wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power
since many citizens do not support him or her.6 By introducing institutions that restrict
1See Benabou (1996) for a survey of this literature.
2See Galor and Zeira (1993) for the former approach, and see Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994) for the latter.
3It is well known that large cross-country dierences in denitions and accuracy of income data yield
serious measurement error problems. In order to improve data quality, Deininger and Squire (1996) compile
a large panel data set based on stringent criteria to ensure consistency of data among countries.
4Forbes (2000) and Banerjee and Duo (2003) also use panel data to study the impact of inequality on
growth. Forbes (2000) nds a positive impact and Banerjee and Duo (2003) nds a nonlinear impact. The
dierent results between Barro (2000) and Forbes (2000) may come from the dierence in the compositions
of their samples. Forbes (2000) excludes very poor countries from the sample owing to data limitations.
5See, among others, Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al.
(2001), and Rodrik et al. (2004).
6We borrow the term \extractive institutions" from Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). Acemoglu et al. (2002)
use the term extractive institutions to refer to the institutions that \concentrate power in the hands of a
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the ruler's conscatory behavior, the ruler can commit to a decrease in expropriation and
gains large support from citizens. The ruler hence faces a trade-o between expropriation of
citizens' wealth and hold on power.
We consider inequality as an important factor that inuences the ruler's trade-o and
aects the institutional choice by the ruler and growth as a result. The central idea of this
paper is that larger inequality among citizens makes the support for the ruler less responsive
to the choice of the institution by the ruler. We assume that the incumbent ruler's hold on
power depends on the support share of citizens. Citizens prefer to replace the incumbent
ruler if the institution is suciently extractive. The threshold level of institutional quality at
which a citizen is indierent on whether the ruler remains in power depends on the citizen's
income level and diers across citizens. When inequality among the citizens is large, the
distribution of this threshold is dispersed. In this situation, the ruler can adopt an extractive
institution without a signicant increase in the risk of losing power. Hence, large inequality
encourages the ruler to create an extractive institution, and thus impedes investment and
growth.
Figure 1 illustrates this idea. The horizontal axis represents institutional quality. The two
curves represent the density of the distribution of the threshold level of institutional quality
at which a citizen is indierent on whether to support the incumbent ruler. While one curve
shows homogeneous political preferences, the other shows dispersed political preferences.
Suppose that the vertical line X represents the institutional quality chosen by the incumbent
ruler. If the institutional quality chosen by the incumbent ruler falls below the threshold
of a citizen, the citizen does not support the ruler. The areas painted gray thus represent
the share of citizens supporting the incumbent ruler. When the distribution of political
preferences is dispersed, there is little increase in the share of citizens supporting the ruler
even if the ruler improves the quality of the institution from X to Y. Since large inequality
corresponds to dispersed political preferences, large inequality means a small marginal benet
from improving institutional quality for the ruler, which leads to extractive institutions and
impedes growth.
The basic mechanism is similar to the probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull
1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000). As in the probabilistic voting
model, the less dispersed the distribution of citizens' political preferences, the more the
politicians must be concerned about their welfare since the share of supporters is more
responsive to the policy choice.
There is some empirical support for the viewpoint that inequality aects institutions.
Keefer and Knack (2002) nd that inequality signicantly decreases the level of property
rights protection and that the deterioration of property rights protection is the primary
channel of the eect of inequality on growth. You and Khagram (2005) nd that income
inequality has a positive and substantial impact on corruption. Easterly (2007) nds that
inequality is negatively related to a quality measure of institutions that reects governmental
eectiveness, freedom from corruption, political stability, and so on. Chong and Gradstein
small elite and create a high risk of expropriation for the majority of the population" (p.1235). In the model
of this paper, we say that institutions are extractive when the property rights of citizens are not protected
and the ruler in power can expropriate a large share of citizens' wealth.
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Figure 1: The marginal eect of institutional choice on support share.
(2007) conrm that there is a bidirectional causality between income inequality and poor
institutions.
Our argument is also related to the research that explores the link between \middle class
consensus" and economic development. Easterly (2001) denes the middle class consensus as
\a situation of relative equality and ethnic homogeneity" (p.319), and nds that societies with
a large homogeneous middle class attain higher economic growth.7 Our argument provides
one theoretical explanation why the middle class consensus is important for economic growth.
Our model implies that when there is a large middle class that shares similar political
preferences, a politician in power serves them since the citizens' support share is responsive
to the politician's behavior. The existence of a middle class consensus thereby prevents
the politician in power from exerting political power for his or her own sake and would be
benecial for economic development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this paper to the existing
work. Section 3 builds the model and analyzes the eect of inequality on equilibrium growth.
Section 4 provides some numerical examples to conrm that the predictions of the model do
not change if we relax some assumptions. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
There are two major explanations on the relationship between inequality and growth. The
rst one focuses on credit market imperfections. Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that since
large inequality makes the credit constraint binding for many poor agents, it decreases human
capital investment and impedes economic growth. However, Barro (2000) nds that the ex-
tent of credit market development does not signicantly inuence the relationship between
inequality and growth. The second major explanation focuses on the political economic
mechanism. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that large
7He argues that if societies lack a middle class consensus, the elite underinvest in education and infras-
tructure for fear of losing their political power.
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inequality leads to large scale redistribution as a result of majority voting, discourages the
incentive to invest, and hinders economic growth.8 Although these theories predict a posi-
tive relationship between inequality and redistribution and a negative relationship between
redistribution and economic growth, Perotti (1996) argues that both these relationships are
not supported empirically.9
More recent studies also explain the negative relationship between inequality and growth
based on political economic mechanism. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) build a model of
oligarchy where the elite choose whether or not to subsidize the education of the poor and
argue that the elite block the development of education in order to prevent democratization
when inequality between the elite and the poor is large. Galor et al. (2009) argue that large
inequality in landownership prevents the provision of public education since great landowners
are likely to oppose educational policies that promote the accumulation of human capital.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing a new political economic mechanism
relating inequality and growth.
This paper argues that inequality harms the protection of property rights and impedes
investment and growth. In this sense, this paper is related to the studies that analyze
the relationship between inequality and institutions (Cervellati et al. 2008; Engerman and
Sokolo 1997; Glaeser et al. 2003; Gradstein 2007; Sokolo and Engerman 2000; Sonin
2003). This paper provides a new insight that when inequality is large, the ruler who designs
institutions can build extractive institutions because the public support for the ruler is not
responsive to the change in institutions.
This paper is also related to the literature on the political economy of dictatorship (Ace-
moglu et al. 2004; Acemoglu 2005; Besley and Kudamatsu 2008; Grossman and Noh 1994;
Mcguire and Olson 1996; Overland et al. 2005; Padro i Miquel 2007; Shen 2007; Wintrobe
1990). The common feature between the present paper and these papers is that a ruler
chooses a policy to pursue personal benet but the policy choice aects the probability of
the ruler staying in power.10 However, the eects of inequality on this trade-o for the ruler
have been largely unexplored. The work of Acemoglu et al. (2004) is a notable exception and
they consider inequality as a factor making the ruler refrain from expropriation. Contrary to
their results, this paper asserts that inequality allows a ruler to expropriate citizens' wealth
easily.
Finally, since government expropriation is a sort of corruption, this paper is related to
the studies on inequality and corruption (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Eicher et al 2009) and
the studies on corruption and growth (Barreto 2000; Dalgic and Long 2006; de la Croix and
Delavallade 2009; Ehrlich and Lui 1999; Long and Sorger 2006; Mohtadi and Roe 2003).
8Similar models are presented by Perotti (1993), Bertola (1993), and Benabou (1996).
9Moreover, evidence that focuses on the political system does not support the redistribution approach. If
the redistribution channel is crucial in the relationship between inequality and growth, the negative eect of
inequality on growth would be larger in democratic countries. However, this is against the evidence found
by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Deininger and Squire (1998). Knack and Keefer (1997) investigate the
relationship between inequality and economic growth in democracies and nondemocracies, and conclude that
the impact of inequality in nondemocracies is not signicantly lower than that in democracies.
10This paper is also related to the literature on political agencies that explores whether citizens can prevent
politicians in power from exhibiting opportunistic behavior (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Persson and Tabellini
2000; Besley 2006).
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3 Model
3.1 Economic Environment
We consider an overlapping generations economy where citizens live for two periods. Each
citizen has one child, and hence there is no population growth; the population of citizens
in each generation is normalized to 1. In the rst period, citizens form the human capital.
In the second period, they produce consumption goods, consume them, and participate in
political activities.11
The level of human capital of each citizen depends on his or her eort input in the rst
period of life and parental human capital. We assume a Cobb-Douglas-type human capital
production function
hit+1 =
1

eith
1 
it ;  2 (0; 1); (1)
where hit+1 denotes the human capital level of a citizen born at period t and belonging to
dynasty i, and eit is his or her eort input. The externality of parental human capital enables
the economy to grow, and also reproduces the inequality of a generation in the succeeding
generation.
Dierences in human capital constitute the source of income inequality in the economy.
We assume that the distribution of human capital in the initial generation is uniform with
support:12 
1  
2
; 1 +

2

;  2 (0; 2):
The mean of the distribution is normalized to 1, and the density is given by 1=. As we
will see later, in equilibrium, the level of human capital of each citizen is proportional to his
or her parental human capital. Thus, the distribution of human capital of each generation
is uniform, in which the density depends inversely on . Parameter  hence represents the
degree of inequality in the economy. A large  corresponds to a high level of inequality.
In the second period of life, each citizen produces consumption goods with the following
production technology:
yit = Athit; (2)
where yit denotes the production level of citizen i, and At denotes the productivity of the
economy.
The utility of each citizen depends on his or her consumption and public goods. There
are n types of public goods, and the citizens have dierent preferences for them. A citizen
can benet from only one type of public good. Hence, we can divide the citizens into n types
according to their preferences for the public goods. Let  = f1;    ; ng denote the set of
the types of public goods. Then, we can dene the type of a citizen as  2 , which shows
the type of public good that the citizen prefers. Let g() denote the quantity of public good
of type .
11We restrict political participation to the old generation for simplicity. This restriction does not play any
crucial role in the following analysis.
12In Section 5, we replace the uniform distribution of human capital with a more realistic distribution.
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The probability that the type of a citizen is  is 1=n for all  2 . Thus, the population
and income distribution in each type are equivalent. The citizens' preferences for public
goods come from factors that are independent of their human capital levels. These factors
include, for example, their districts of residence, religion, and ethnicity. If the type of a
citizen  2  represents their district in which the citizen resides, g() would mean the
quantity of public goods located in the district. A citizen can benet only from the public
goods located in his or her own district. We can also interpret  as religion or ethnicity.
Then, g() would mean the quantity of religious institutions or the level of transfer targeted
to a specic ethnic group. Religious institutions are valuable only for those citizens who
believe in the particular religion. If a society is segregated by ethnicity, the government can
make a policy that is favorable for a specic ethnic group.
The utility of a type- citizen in the rst period of life is
U1(e; g()) =  e+ g()  < 1; (3)
where  > 0 is the marginal cost of eort input and  captures the importance of public
goods. The utility of a type- citizen in the second period of life is
U2(c; g()) = c+ g(); (4)
where c denotes consumption. The consumption level of citizen i is equal to his or her after-
tax income, (1  )yi, where  denotes the income tax rate. Citizens do not discount future
utility and thereby invest in human capital so as to maximize U1 + U2. Because citizens
take part in political processes in the second period of life, they make political choices to
maximize U2.
3.2 Political Process
In each generation, there is a set of politicians P . Politicians also live for two periods and
are active only in the second period of life. The utility of politicians also depends on their
consumption and public goods. As in the case for the utility of citizens, politicians also can
benet from only one type of public good and their preferences are also represented by (4).
A type- politician represents the interests of type- citizens in the policy area of public
goods provision. The probability that a randomly selected politician is type- is 1=n for all
 2 .
In the beginning of each period t, a politician is chosen randomly from the old generation's
set of politicians P and he or she occupies the seat of power. We call this politician the
\incumbent ruler." Since our focus is not on the selection of a ruler but on the behavior of
the selected ruler, we simply assume the random selection of a ruler.
After occupying the seat of power, the incumbent ruler designs the institution for the
period. The ruler can make political and judicial reforms to get unconstrained power of
decision in order to derive large private benets. However, as we will see below, such a
discretionary power enables the ruler to expropriate much of citizens' wealth and causes
political instability. Conversely, by restricting the power of the government, the ruler can
commit to not abusing power, which would make the position of the ruler stable. North
6
and Weingast (1989), analyzing the institutions of seventeenth-century England, argue that
a parliament constraining the ruler's behavior can make the ruler commit credibly to give
up conscatory behavior. Wright (2008) also argues that authoritarian regimes that need to
facilitate investment create binding legislatures to commit credibly to restrict expropriation.
We represent institution quality by the upper limit of the tax rate t that the ruler can levy.
Any ruler in power cannot impose a tax on citizens' income that is higher than this upper
limit. A low level of t means that the property rights of citizens are well protected. When
t is high, we say that the institution is extractive. The ruler can decrease the upper limit
of the tax rate by creating a well-functioning checks and balances system.
After observing the institution that the incumbent ruler chooses, each citizen decides
whether or not to support the incumbent ruler. At this stage, the incumbent ruler cannot
commit to a policy that he or she will implement after retaining power. Citizens hence make
their political choices anticipating that the ruler in power will implement his or her most
preferred policy. Whether the incumbent ruler can stay in power during the period depends
on the share of citizens who support the incumbent ruler. Denoting the share of supporters
as s 2 [0; 1], we represent the probability of the incumbent ruler staying in power as
p(s) =
8<:0 0  s < 1nmin  s  1n ; 1	 1n  s  1; (5)
where  > 0 and  2 (0; 1]. The probability p(s) is nondecreasing in s.13 While we assume
that  = 1 for simplicity, we consider the case of  < 1 numerically in Section 5.
In equilibrium, the incumbent ruler gains the support of all citizens who are of the same
type as the ruler. Therefore, the share of supporters s is not less than 1=n in equilibrium.
Equation (5) states that if the incumbent ruler cannot gain any support from the citizens
whose preference are dierent from the incumbent ruler, the survival probability is zero.
This assumption is imposed to focus on the case in which the ruler cares about the support
from citizens whose preference are dierent from the ruler.
The survival probability of the incumbent ruler is introduced to analyze the trade-o
between the ruler's expropriation of citizens' wealth and hold on power. We adopt this set-
up to describe the politics in nondemocratic regimes. In nondemocratic regimes, the political
function of elections is restricted, but the public opposition of citizens can threaten the power
of rulers in a variety of ways.14 Our assumption implies that a ruler is less likely to hold
power when a larger share of citizens oppose the ruler. The negative relationship between a
ruler's survival probability and the share of opposing citizens can be interpreted in several
ways. First, when the opponents of a ruler appeal to arms, the force will be stronger when
the number of opponents is larger. Second, even if a ruler has a strong army that can repress
13A similar formulation is used in Grossman and Noh (1994) and Overland et al. (2005). In both studies,
as in this paper, a ruler derives utility from own consumption and faces the probability of losing power.
The ruler's probability of retaining power depends on the expected utility of a representative producer in
Grossman and Noh (1994) and on the level of domestic capital in Overland et al. (2005). We refer to this
probability (given by (5)) as the \survival probability," as in Grossman and Noh (1994).
14Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) state that \The citizens are excluded from the political system in non-
democracy, but they are nonetheless the majority and they can sometimes challenge the system, create
signicant social unrest and turbulence, or even pose a serious revolutionary threat." (p.25).
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anti-government demonstrations, the more citizens participate in a demonstration, the larger
is the cost of repression for the ruler because a large number of victims of repression may
result in sanctions from the international community, which can bring about a downfall of
the ruler. Third, since the cost of participating in anti-government demonstrations decreases
as the number of participants increases, demonstrations are more likely to take place when
more citizens oppose the government. Fourth, if a military coup needs a pretext for replacing
an incumbent ruler, a low share of support from citizens is a justiable cause.
If the incumbent ruler loses power, a new ruler is chosen from P in a random manner.
We assume that the incumbent ruler's utility is zero if he or she loses power. At the end
of the period, the ruler in power chooses the tax rate t 2 [0; t] and allocates tax revenue
between public goods provision and private consumption. The ruler diverts a fraction of tax
revenue rt to private consumption. In the process of misuse of tax revenue, a fraction of tax
revenue C(rt) disappears as the cost of appropriating public funds, represented by
15
C(rt) =
r1+t
1 + 
;  > 0: (6)
Let Ht denote the aggregate level of human capital and Yt = AtHt denote the aggregate
output. The government budget constraint in period t is given by
rtTt +
X
2
gt() = [1  C(rt)]Tt (7)
Tt = tYt: (8)
In the case of a change in power, the productivity of the economy decreases by a fraction
 2 (0; 1). This parameter represents the cost of political instability, which comes from, for
example, a delay in policy decisions or disorder caused by an internal conict. Let A denote
the productivity when the incumbent ruler stays in power, and ~A  (1   )A denote the
productivity when there is a change in power. Each citizen will support the incumbent ruler
if and only if the utility under the incumbent regime is not less than the expected utility
after a change in power.
The timing of events in the political process in period t is as follows:
1. A politician is chosen randomly from P to be the incumbent ruler.
2. The incumbent ruler chooses the upper limit of the tax rate t for the period.
3. Each citizen decides whether or not to support the incumbent ruler, and the ruler's
probability of staying in power is determined.
4. If the incumbent ruler loses power, a new ruler rises to power. The ruler in power
chooses the policy (t; rt; fgt()g2).
15This cost includes, for example, the loss due to the inecient allocation of government posts for the
ruler's family members or the resources used for cover-up.
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4 Equilibrium
We briey dene the equilibrium of this model. The politico-economic equilibrium must
satisfy the following conditions.
 Optimal human capital investment : Given the expected return on human capital in-
vestment, each citizen must invest in human capital in order to maximize his or her
utility.
 Optimal policy making by the ruler in power : The ruler in power chooses a policy to
maximize his or her utility.
 Sincere support of citizens: Comparing the utility under the incumbent's regime and
the expected utility after the change in power, each citizen sincerely chooses whether
or not to support the incumbent.
 Optimal institution for the incumbent ruler : Taking into account the political action of
citizens, the incumbent ruler chooses an institution in order to maximize the expected
utility.
 Perfect foresight : All citizens have the same expectation about the return on human
capital, and this expectation is met.
4.1 Human Capital Investment
First, we consider the optimal human capital investment of each citizen in the rst period of
life. The return on human capital investment depends on the political results in the second
period of life. Thus, each citizen expects political results in the next period and makes eort
input according to his or her expectation. Suppose that in period t, each citizen expects
that the incumbent ruler in the next period will stay in power with probability p^t+1 and will
choose tax rate ^t+1, and that the new ruler will choose tax rate ^
N
t+1. Then, the expected
income of citizen i in period t+ 1 is
E[yit+1] = [p^t+1(1  ^t+1) + (1  p^t+1)(1  ^Nt+1)(1  )]Ahit+1: (9)
Now, let us dene the expected return on human capital by R^t+1  [p^t+1(1   ^t+1) + (1  
p^t+1)(1  ^Nt+1)(1  )]A. Each citizen chooses the level of eort input to solve the following
maximization problem:
max
eit
R^t+1
1

eith
1 
it   eit: (10)
Solving this problem, we obtain
eit =
 
R^t+1

! 1
1 
hit; (11)
hit+1 =
 
R^t+1

! 
1 
hit

: (12)
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Equation (11) shows that the optimal eort is increasing in the expected return on human
capital R^, which is decreasing in ^ and ^N . The eect of p^ on R^ depends on the magnitude
relation between (1   ^) and (1   ^N )(1   ). If (1   ^) > (1   ^N )(1   ), which holds in
equilibrium, the expectation of political stability positively aects human capital investment.
The eort input is also increasing in the level of parental human capital hit because of the
intergenerational externality of parental human capital.
Equation (12) implies a positive linear relationship between the human capital of parents
and children. This relationship makes the evolution of income distribution quite simple.
The linear relationship in (12) implies that the relative human capital of a dynasty i to
the aggregate human capital ~hit  hit=Ht is constant in all periods. Thus, ~hit follows the
same distribution as hi0 since H0 = 1.
16 In addition, if the distribution of human capital
of a generation is uniform, that of the succeeding generation will also be uniform. Since
we suppose that human capital in the initial generation follows a uniform distribution, the
distribution of human capital in each generation will be uniform in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The optimal eort input of each citizen is represented by (11). Eort input
eit in human capital production is increasing in the expected return on human capital R^
and parental human capital. In equilibrium, the distribution of relative human capital ~hit is
always uniform and the same as that of the initial generation
U

1  
2

;

1 +

2

: (13)
4.2 Political Process
The level of human capital in period t is determined by investment in the previous period.
Given the distribution of human capital, we solve the political game in period t by backward
induction. In the following, we omit the subscript t except when necessary.
4.2.1 Optimal Policy of the Ruler in Power
Assume that a type-0 2  politician is in power. The ruler chooses a policy that solves the
following problem:
max
(;r;fg()g2)
rT + g(0)
s.t. (7), (8), and  2 [0;  ]:
(14)
Clearly, it is suboptimal for the ruler to provide a positive amount of public good of any
type other than 0. Based on this fact and the government budget constraint (7), we see
that the utility of the ruler is increasing in  . Thus, the ruler sets the tax rate as  and
allocates the tax revenue between private consumption and the public good of own type.
The allocation is determined to equalize the marginal benet from the appropriation of tax
revenue to the marginal cost. A marginal increase in appropriation rate dr increases private
consumption by Tdr but decreases the resources available to produce the public good g(0)
16Therefore, we do not consider the dynamics of inequality, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
10
by (1 + C 0(r))Tdr. The ruler therefore chooses an allocation so that 1 = (1 + C 0(r)). The
optimal policy of the ruler (t ; r

t ; fgt ()g2) can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2. A type-0 ruler chooses the policy (t ; r

t ; fgt ()g2) that satises the following:
 The tax rate is equal to the upper limit, that is, t = t.
 The rate of rent extraction rt is given by
rt =

1  

 1

 r: (15)
 The level of public good gt () is zero for any  6= 0, and gt (0) is given by
gt (
0) =

1  r 1 + 
(1 + )

T t ; (16)
where T t = 

t Yt.
4.2.2 Political Choices of Citizens
Anticipating the policy (; r; fg()g2) that the ruler in power will choose, each citizen
decides whether or not to support the incumbent ruler. We denote the type of the incumbent
ruler as I .
Each citizen supports the incumbent ruler if and only if the utility under the incumbent's
policy is not less than the expected utility that the citizen obtains after the change in power.
If the incumbent ruler is replaced, a new ruler seizes power, and this is benecial to citizens
who prefer the same type of public good as the new ruler. However, a change in power
decreases the productivity of the economy by .
Since the new ruler is randomly chosen when the incumbent ruler is replaced, the prob-
ability that the type- politician becomes the new ruler is 1=n for all  2 . The policy
that the ruler in power will choose is given by lemma 2, and therefore, the expected utility
W (hi; ) that a type- citizen i obtains in the case of a regime change is given by
W (hi; ) = (1  ) ~Ahi + 
n

1  r 1 + 
(1 + )

 ~AH
= (1  ) ~Ahi + 	AH;
(17)
where
	  (1  )
n

1  r 1 + 
(1 + )

: (18)
The rst term in (17) is the after-tax income of citizen i and the second term is the expected
utility from public good provision of the new ruler.
A type- citizen i supports the incumbent ruler if and only if
(1  )Ahi + g()  (1  ) ~Ahi + 	AH; (19)
where g() is the public good of type  that the incumbent ruler will provide. When the
incumbent ruler keeps power, the citizens with the same preference as the incumbent ruler
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receive the public good with probability one. When the incumbent ruler loses power, they
receive the public good with probability less than one and incur a productivity loss due to
political instability. Hence, the citizens with the same preference as the incumbent ruler
always support the incumbent ruler. Since the incumbent ruler cannot commit to a policy
that will be implemented at the end of the period, the incumbent ruler can credibly promise
the provision of public good only to the citizens with the same preference as the incumbent
ruler.17
The citizens whose preferences are dierent from I will support the incumbent ruler if
and only if
(1  )Ahi  (1  ) ~Ahi + 	AH: (20)
We dene  as   	=. Then, we can rewrite this condition as
~hi  
1     (); (21)
where  0 > 0 and  00 > 0.
The political choices of type- 6= I citizens are characterized by the threshold  (), and
this threshold is increasing in  . Citizens with a higher relative human capital ~hi than  ()
would support the incumbent ruler. Hence, rich citizens tend to support the incumbent ruler
but poor ones do not, and the number of supporters is decreasing in  . The interpretation of
this result is quite simple. On the one hand, there is a cost of regime change for citizens from
the decrease in the return on human capital; this cost is proportional to the level of human
capital. On the other hand, there is a benet from regime change due to the provision of own
type of public good that can be realized with probability 1=n, and this benet is equal for
all citizens regardless of the level of human capital. Citizens with higher human capital thus
tend to support the incumbent ruler. As the level of  increases, the budget scale allocated
to the public good rises, and the benet of regime change for type- 6= I citizens also goes
up. Furthermore, since a large level of  means that a large share of income is levied as tax,
the cost of political instability is small for citizens. Thus, a high level of  leads to a small
support share among type- 6= I citizens. Conversely, the incumbent ruler can increase his
or her political support by lowering  . By designing a well-functioning checks and balances
system, the incumbent ruler can make credible promises to protect citizens' property rights.
In equilibrium, the distribution of ~hi is as given in (13). Thus, from the above results,
the share of supporters can be written as
s( ; ) =
1
n
+
n  1
n
Z 1+ 2
 ()
1

d~hi  1
n
+
n  1
n
'( ; ); (22)
where
'( ; ) =
8>>><>>>:
0  () > 1 + 2 ;
1


1 + 2    ()

 () 2
h
1  2 ; 1 + 2
i
;
1  () < 1  2 :
(23)
The value of function '( ; ) represents the support share of type- 6= I citizens when the
institution is  .
17This formulation is based on the model of clientelism developed in Robinson et al. (2006).
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Then, from (5) and (22), the incumbent ruler's probability of staying in power is given
by
p( ; ) = min

(n  1)
n
'( ; ); 1

: (24)
The survival probability represented in equation (24) captures the constraint that the in-
cumbent ruler in a nondemocratic regime faces. If the ruler chooses an institution where
the ruler can extract a larger share of citizens' income, more citizens will not support the
ruler and it would become more dicult for the ruler to retain political power. Equation
(24) shows the important trade-o between the incumbent ruler's expropriation and hold on
power.
Inequality aects the eect of  on the survival probability. By dierentiating p with
respect to  , we obtain
@p
@
( ; ) =
(n  1)
n
@'
@
( ; ) =  (n  1)
n
 0()

: (25)
The derivative @p( ; )=@ is negative and increasing in . This means that the negative
impact of  on the survival probability p( ; ) is small when inequality is large. We can illus-
trate this result by using Figure 2. Suppose that there are two economies, an equal economy
and an unequal one. The distribution of relative human capital ~hi in the unequal economy
is more dispersed with a small density of distribution. Thus, the political preferences of
citizens are more dispersed in the unequal economy. In Figure 2, 1=0 denotes the density
of the distribution in the equal economy, and 1= the density in the unequal one. Since the
threshold  () is independent of the distribution of ~hi as shown in (21), the same threshold
divides the political behavior of citizens in both the economies. However, a change in the
incumbent's choice of institution has dierent impacts on survival probability in the two
economies. Suppose that the incumbent ruler decreases the upper limit of tax rate from  to
 0. This change increases the support for the incumbent ruler, but the increase is lower in the
unequal economy than in the equal one. This is because the density of the distribution of ~hi
is low in the unequal economy. In the unequal economy where citizens' political preferences
are dispersed, few citizens share similar political preferences. Thus, in the face of a change
in institution, few citizens change their political attitude. Hence, when inequality is large,
a marginal decrease in  has a small impact on the incumbent ruler's survival probability.
The relationship between inequality and the incumbent ruler's institutional choice, which we
will explain in the next subsection, depends crucially on this mechanism.
The above results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, the citizens' political choices and the resulting survival probability
of the incumbent ruler entail the following.
 All type-I citizens support the incumbent ruler.
 Type- 6= I citizens support the incumbent if and only if
~hi   ();
where the threshold  () is given by (21).
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Figure 2: Marginal eects of  on p( ; )
 The probability of the incumbent ruler staying in power is
p( ; ) = min

(n  1)
n
'( ; ); 1

;
where '( ; ) is the support share of citizens with preferences other than I and is given
by
'( ; ) =
Z 1+ 2
 ()
1

d~hi:
 Probability p( ; ) is decreasing in  , and the increase in p( ; ) due to a decrease in 
is small when the degree of inequality  is large.
4.2.3 Optimal Institution for the Incumbent Ruler
Finally, we proceed to investigate the problem of the incumbent ruler. If the incumbent ruler
loses power, his or her payo is zero. If the incumbent ruler retains power, he or she chooses
a policy as described in lemma 2. In this case, the payo of the incumbent ruler is given by
[r + (1  r   C(r)]AH. The problem of the incumbent ruler can thus be given by
max

p( ; ) : (26)
Note that it is suboptimal for the incumbent ruler to choose an institution such that
 () > 1 + =2 and  () < 1   =2. If  () > 1 + =2, the survival probability and payo
of the ruler will be zero. If  () < 1   =2, the ruler can increase  without decreasing his
or her survival probability.
Assuming an interior solution (p(; ) < 1), from the rst-order condition, the optimal
institution for the incumbent ruler  satises
p0(; ) + p(; ) = 0: (27)
Equation (27) states that the incumbent ruler balances the trade-o between expropriation
and political survival. While on the one hand, a marginal increase in  decreases the sur-
vival probability and reduces the incumbent ruler's payo by  p0( ; ) , on the other, a
14
Upper limit of tax rates
Elasticity
An increase in
Figure 3: Equilibrium quality of the chosen institution
marginal increase in  raises tax revenue and increases the ruler's payo by p( ; ). The
incumbent ruler will choose the institution that balances the marginal benet and marginal
cost. Equation (27) can be rewritten as
T = p(
; ); (28)
where
T = 1; p(
; ) =  p
0(; )
p(; )
:
The left-hand side of (28), T , is the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to  , which is
always equal to 1, and the right-hand side, p( ; ), is the elasticity of the survival probability
with respect to  . The incumbent ruler will choose  that equalize these two elasticities.
The elasticity of the survival probability is decreasing in the degree of inequality  due to
the mechanism that we mentioned previously.18 When the degree of inequality is large, the
survival probability will not be responsive to a change in  , and the incumbent ruler can
increase  with little threat to power. Inequality will hence tend to increase  that the
incumbent ruler chooses.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium institution that the incumbent ruler chooses. The
elasticity of tax revenue, T , is represented by the horizontal line and that of the survival
probability p( ; ) is the upward-sloping curve. The equilibrium institution is determined
at the intersection of the two graphs. Since an increase in  shifts the curve of p( ; )
downward, the equilibrium degree of extractive institution  is increasing in .
We can analytically solve the rst-order condition with respect to  and obtain
() = 1 
s

+ 1 + 2
: (29)
18From (21), (23), and (24), we derive
p( ; ) =  p
0( ; )
p( ; )
=

1 + =2   ()

(1  )2 :
We see that p( ; ) is increasing in  and decreasing in .
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Equation (29) shows that () is indeed increasing in .
Proposition 1. The larger the degree of inequality , the more extractive the institution
that the incumbent ruler chooses.
Since we assume an interior solution, the equilibrium survival probability of the incum-
bent ruler is given by19
p() =
(n  1)
n
0@1 + 
2
+   
s
1 +
1 + 2

1A : (30)
The eect of inequality on political stability is ambiguous. An increase in  leads to a more
extractive institution (higher ) and decreases the support share (institutional eect). In
addition, an increase in  transforms the distribution of relative human capital. Keeping
the threshold  () xed, an increase in  changes the share of citizens with higher relative
human capital than  (), thus changing the support share (distributional eect). This
eect is negative when  () < 1 and is positive when  () > 1. Thus, if  (())  1,
the eect of  on p() is negative. Otherwise, the sign of the eect is determined by the
magnitude relation between these two opposing eects. The following proposition indicates
the U-shaped relationship between inequality and political stability.
Proposition 2. The eects of inequality on political stability depend on the institutional
and distributional eects. Inequality will decrease political stability if and only if
1 + p

>
1 + + 4q
1 + + 2
: (31)
Since the right-hand side of (31) is increasing in , the relationship between inequality and
political stability is non-monotonic and U-shaped.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Consider the population share of citizens
whose income is higher than a certain threshold level. If the threshold is the average, the
population share is the same in the equal economy and the unequal economy because the
distribution is now uniform. If the threshold is higher than the average, the population
share of citizens whose income is higher than the threshold level is larger in the unequal
economy, and the dierence increases with the threshold level. The distributional eect is
hence strong when the threshold  (()) is high. If the threshold  (()) is equal to
or less than 1, both the institutional and distributional eects are negative, and political
stability is decreasing in . When the threshold  (()) is higher than 1 but low enough,
the institutional eect dominates the distributional eect, and thus, an increase in inequality
reduces political stability.20 A further increase in inequality increases () and  (()).
Then, the distributional eect becomes important and dominates the institutional eect. In
this situation, an increase in inequality brings about more political stability.
19To ensure the interior solution p((); ) < 1, the parameter  must be suciently small. Note that
p((); ) < 1 when  = 1.
20Alesina and Perotti (1996) nd that inequality is negatively related with political stability.
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4.3 Equilibrium Growth Rate and Inequality
In the previous subsection, we showed that inequality yields an extractive institution. Now,
we investigate the eects of inequality on economic growth.
The equilibrium return on human capital is
R() = (1  ())[p() + (1  p())(1  )]A: (32)
Equation (32) shows that R() is decreasing in () and increasing in p(). Since political
changes lead to productivity loss, a high probability of political changes would decrease the
return.
The eects of inequality on the return of human capital R() are decomposed into two
eects. First, an increase in  leads to more a extractive institution (i.e., a higher ()),
and decreases R(). Second, an increase in  aects the political stability p((); ), and
thereby, aects R(). As shown in Proposition 2, this eect of  on p((); ) is ambiguous.
However, as the following lemma states, the overall eects of  on R() are always negative.
Lemma 4. The eects of inequality  on the equilibrium return of human capital are nega-
tive.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In equilibrium, citizens predict the future political results correctly, and therefore, R^ =
R. Then, from (12), the growth rate of the aggregate human capital is given by
Ht+1
Ht
=
1


R

 
1 
: (33)
The growth rate of aggregate human capital depends positively on R().
The equilibrium aggregate output is given by
Y t =
8<:AHt with probability p();(1  )AHt with probability 1  p(): (34)
Therefore, the expected level of output E(Y t ) is
E(Y t ) = (1  (1  p))AHt : (35)
Let us dene the average growth rate of output between periods t and t + 1 such that
E(Y t+1)=E(Y

t ). Then, the average growth rate of output is equal to the growth rate of
aggregate human capital and is increasing in R(). Thus, we derive the following proposition
on the eects of inequality on the growth rate.
Proposition 3. The growth rate of human capital and the average growth rate of output
E(Y t+1)=E(Y

t ) are decreasing in inequality .
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5 Numerical Examples
In the previous sections, we assumed that the distribution of relative human capital is uniform
so that one could analyze the model in a simple way. However, the assumption of uniform
distribution may seem a bit unrealistic, and one may doubt whether our results hold when we
assume a more realistic distribution. In order to answer this question, this section provides
some numerical examples with a more realistic distribution of relative human capital.
We suppose that the distribution of relative income yit=Yt follows a log-normal distribu-
tion, F (), which is commonly used as an approximation to income distribution.21 In the
model, the relative human capital ~hit coincides with the relative income. Furthermore, when
the relative income follows a log-normal distribution, the shape of the distribution of income
yi is the same as the distribution of yi=Y except for the mean. The mean of F is equal to
1 since F is a distribution of relative income. We examine the dierent variances of relative
income in the range where the corresponding Gini coecients are close to the actual ones.22
Figure 4 shows the shapes of relative income distribution with the same mean but dierent
dispersions. The solid line represents the density of relative income in the economy where
the Gini coecient is 0.30, which is close to the coecients in East Asian countries.23 The
dotted line represents the density of relative income in the more unequal economy where the
Gini coecient is 0.50, which is close to the coecients in Latin American countries.24 The
dashed line represents the distribution of relative income in the economy with an interme-
diate level of inequality. As Figure 4 clearly shows, a more equal income distribution will
have a larger density in a considerable part of the range of relative income, especially around
the mean. Since the main mechanism of our model is driven by the link between inequality
and the small density of income distribution, we feel that our basic results hold even if we
assume a log-normal distribution. Using a parameterized model, we conrm this conjecture
numerically and examine how a change in inequality could aect the equilibrium tax rate
and equilibrium support share.
Before a detailed specication, we must emphasize the following. Since our model is
not for quantitative analysis and it is dicult to nd plausible empirical targets for some
parameters, we do not oer quantitative predictions. Our focus is on whether the mechanism
of the model is robust to alternative shapes of income distribution. Thus, we focus mainly
on the direction in which an increase in inequality could change the tax rate and political
stability.
We specify the values of the model's parameters to make our numerical analysis as plau-
sible as possible. We must choose three parameters of the model in order to calculate the
numerical values of the equilibrium tax rate and equilibrium share of supporters.25 It is
21Note that the distribution of relative human capital remains unchanged through generations regardless
of the shape of distribution in the initial period.
22We provide more detailed explanations in Appendix C.
23According to Deininger and Squire (1996), the average Gini coecient is 34.19 in South Korea (1953-
1988), 33.49 in Indonesia (1964-1993 ), 29.62 in Taiwan (1964-1993), and 40.12 in Singapore (1973-1989).
24Deiniger and Squire (1996) report that the mean of Gini coecients is 57.32 in Brazil(1960-1989), 51.84
in Chile (1968-1994), 51.51 in Columbia (1970-1991), and 47.99 in Peru (1971-1994).
25We do not calculate the equilibrium survival probability since it would need to specify the values of n
and .
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Figure 4: Log-normal distributions
Parameter Value Description
 0.05 Productivity loss of political instability
	 0.25 Expected gain of political turnover
 0.5 Parameter of political stability function
Table 1: Value of parameters
enough to calculate the share of supporters for identifying the direction in which an increase
in inequality changes the survival probability. The benchmark parameters are shown in Ta-
ble 1. We set the parameter  based on existing empirical research. We set the productivity
loss from political instability, , as 5%, which is the average output loss from a political crisis
in poor countries, as estimated by Cerra and Saxena (2008).
On the remaining two parameters, we examine several values since we have little empirical
evidence. We can interpret the expected gain of political turnover 	 as the degree of political
conict over public expenditure allocation. In the benchmark model, we set 	 = 0:25, which
takes the equilibrium tax rate to around 18%. Tanzi and Zee (2000) report that the average
share of tax revenue to GDP in developing countries is about 18%. We examine cases when
	 = 0:20 and 	 = 0:33. Parameter  reects the elasticity of the probability of political
stability with respect to the number of supporters. We set  = 0:5 in the benchmark, but
also examine the cases where  = 0:33 and  = 0:66.
Since the upper limit of the tax rate  always binds, the equilibrium tax rate is a solution
of the rst-order condition (28). We graphically show how the trade-o that the incumbent
ruler faces would change under a log-normal income distribution, which corresponds to Figure
3 in Section 4. In Figure 5, we plot the values of the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to
 , which is always equal to one, and the values of the elasticity of survival probability with
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Figure 5: Equilibrium tax rates
respect to  under the benchmark parameter values. We examine three economies with Gini
coecients 0.30, 0.40, and 0.50. Figure 5 is consistent with the main results of the model that
the survival probability is more sensitive to institutional changes in more equal economies
and that the equilibrium tax rate is lower in these economies. Thus, this numerical example
suggests that the mechanism of our model does not depend on the assumption of uniform
income distribution.
In Figure 6, we plot the equilibrium tax rates and the equilibrium share of supporters
for various values of 	. Although the expected gain of political turnover 	 aects the levels
of tax rate and share of supporters, the qualitative relationship between these variables and
inequality does not change. An increase in inequality would increase the tax rate and reduce
the share of supporters. Similarly, Figure 7 examines the dierent values of . Figure 7
indicates the quantitative importance of the elasticity of survival probability for the choice
of the incumbent ruler. When the survival probability is sensitive to the support share, the
ruler would avoid choosing a high  and gain more support from the citizens. However, the
positive relationship between inequality and tax rate would hold irrespective of the value of
.
Our quantitative exercise shows that the qualitative prediction of the model does not
change even though we assume a realistic income distribution. This is because a large
inequality would decrease the number of middle class individuals whose income is around
the mean, as shown in Figure 4.
20
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
Gini coefficient
T
a
x
 r
a
t e
s
Inequality and Tax
?
?
? = 0.25
? = 0.20
? = 0.33
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Gini coefficient
S
h
a
r e
 o
f  
s
u
p
p
o
r t
e
r s
Inequality and Political Stability
?
?
? = 0.25
? = 0.20
? = 0.33
Figure 6: Impact of Inequality ( = 0:5)
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Gini coefficient
T
a
x
 r
a
t e
s
Inequality and Tax
?
?
? = 0.50
? = 0.33
? = 0.66
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Gini coefficient
S
h
a
r e
 o
f  
s
u
p
p
o
r t
e
r s
Inequality and Political Stability
?
?
? = 0.5
? = 0.33
? = 0.66
Figure 7: Impact of Inequality (	 = 0:25)
21
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a model that explains the negative eect of inequality on economic
growth in nondemocratic countries. The ruler in a nondemocratic regime chooses institutions
that constrain the policy choice of the ruler. When choosing his or her institutions, the ruler
faces a trade-o between expropriation of citizens' wealth and hold on power. If the ruler
adopts good institutions that prevent the ruler from expropriating citizens' wealth, the ruler
is more likely to retain political power, but obtains small private benet.
We show that inequality makes the ruler choose extractive institutions and hence dis-
courages investment by citizens. This is because political preferences of citizens would be
largely dispersed if inequality among citizens is large. The dispersed political preferences
render public support for the incumbent ruler less responsive to the change in institutions.
In this situation, the marginal eects of introducing good institutions on the ruler's survival
probability are small. Thus, large inequality leads to extractive institutions and impedes
investment and economic growth.
The results of this paper are based on the assumption that equal income distribution
has a large density. This relationship holds to a considerable extent under a log-normal
distribution, which is a standard approximation to income distribution. We provide some
numerical examples to show that the results obtained under the assumption of uniform
income distribution also hold under a log-normal distribution.
These results provide an explanation for the negative relationship between inequality and
growth observed in nondemocratic countries. The prediction of the model that economic
inequality is negatively related with the quality of institutions is also consistent with recent
empirical studies.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2
We derive condition (31) for p() to be decreasing in . Since '()  '((); ) is given by
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Therefore, '0() < 0 if and only if
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By arranging (A3), we get (31).
B. Proof of Lemma 4
We rewrite the equilibrium return on human capital (32) as
R() = [p()(1  ()) + (1  p())(1  ())(1  )]A
= Q()A+ (1  ())(1  )A;
(B1)
where Q() is given by
Q() = (1  ())p(): (B2)
We show that Q() is decreasing in , which implies that R() is also decreasing in  since
(1  ())(1  )A is decreasing in .
From (29), (30), and (B2), we have
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By dierentiating (B3), we have
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(B4) implies that Q0() < 0 if and only if
p

r
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We show that (B5) holds for any  > 0. Now, we dene  () by
 () = 1 + +

4
 p
r
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+
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: (B6)
Since  (0) = 1 +  pp1 +  > 0 and
 0() =
1
4
0@1  pq
1 + + 2
1A > 0; 8 > 0; (B7)
 () > 0 for all  > 0. This means that Q0() < 0 for all  > 0, i.e., Q() is decreasing in .
C. Procedure of Numerical Analysis
We assume that relative human capital ~hi follows a log-normal distribution. For numerical
analysis, we must choose the parameters (; ) of the density function of the log-normal
distribution, which is given by
f(x) =
1p
2x
e 
(ln x )2
22 : (C1)
The distribution function is
F (x) = 

lnx  


; (C2)
where  is the distribution function of a standard normal distribution. The corresponding
mean and variance are given by
E(x) = e+
2
2 ; V (x) = e2+
2
(e
2   1):
Since the mean of relative human capital is always equal to one, we must choose parameters
so that E(x) = 1. Therefore, we choose  so as to satisfy
 =  
2
2
: (C3)
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We identify parameter  from the target Gini coecients. It is known that the Gini
coecient under a log-normal distribution depends only on  and is given by
G = 2

p
2

  1: (C4)
From (C3) and (C4), we can choose (; ) uniquely if we have the target value of Gini
coecients, G.
Using (C1) and (C2), we calculate the equilibrium tax rate. When ~hi follows a log-normal
distribution, equation (23) (which represents the support share of citizens with preferences
other than I) is replaced by
'() =
Z 1
 ()
f(x)dx = 1  F ( ()): (C5)
From (C2), (C3), and (C5), the rst-order condition (28) is replaced by
1 =
 0()
'()
f( ())
=

1  

ln ()

+

2
 1

(1  )2 f( ()) :
(C6)
From equations (C5) and (C6), we can calculate the equilibrium institution, which is equal
to the equilibrium tax rate, and the equilibrium share of supporters.
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